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Abstract. Fast analysis of correlated spam emails may be vital in
the effort of finding and prosecuting spammers performing cybercrimes
such as phishing and online frauds. This paper presents a self-learning
framework to automatically divide and classify large amounts of spam
emails in correlated labeled groups. Building on large datasets daily col-
lected through honeypots, the emails are firstly divided into homoge-
neous groups of similar messages (campaigns), which can be related to
a specific spammer. Each campaign is then associated to a class which
specifies the goal of the spammer, i.e. phishing, advertisement, etc. The
proposed framework exploits a categorical clustering algorithm to group
similar emails, and a classifier to subsequently label each email group.
The main advantage of the proposed framework is that it can be used
on large spam emails datasets, for which no prior knowledge is provided.
The approach has been tested on more than 3200 real and recent spam
emails, divided in more than 60 campaigns, reporting a classification
accuracy of 97% on the classified data.
1 Introduction
At the end of 2014, emails are still one of the most common form of communica-
tion in Internet. Unfortunately, emails are also the main vector for sending unso-
licited bulks of messages, generally for commercial purpose, commonly known as
spam. The research community has investigated the problem for several years,
proposing tools and methodologies to mitigate this issue. However, a definitive
solution to the problem of spam emails still has to be found. In fact, accord-
ing to McAfee Report [19], unsolicited emails, constitute more than 70 percent
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of total amount of email messages in 2014. Moreover, Cisco Report [26] shows
that spam volume increased 250 percent from January 2014 to November 2014.
Unfortunately, the problem of spam emails is not only related to unsolicited
advertisement. Spam emails have become a vector to perform different kinds of
cybercrimes including phishing, cyber-frauds and spreading malware.
Motivation: Trying to filter spam emails at the user end, actually is not enough
to fight this kind of attacks, which moves the effect of unsolicited spam emails
from illicit to real crime. Finding the spammers becomes important not only to
tackle at the source the problem of spam emails, but also to legally prosecute
the responsible of cybercrimes brought by spam emails different from undesired
advertisement. To identify spammers, the early analysis of huge amount of mes-
sages to find correlated spam emails with the specific spammer purpose is vital.
Several papers in the literature observed that the forensic analysis, which plays a
major role in finding and persecuting spammers for cybercrimes, needs a proac-
tive mechanism or tool which is able to perform a fast, multi-staged analysis
of emails in a timely fashion [9,10,14,29]. To this end, large amounts of spam
emails, generally collected through honeypots should be at first divided in simi-
lar groups, which could be related to the same spammer (i.e., spam campaigns).
Afterward to each campaign should be assigned a label describing the purpose
of spammer. This goal-based labeling facilitates for investigators the analysis
of spam campaigns, eventually directed toward a specific cybercrime. However,
this analysis generally appears to be a challenging task. In fact, considering the
number of produced spam emails and their variance, spam email datasets are
huge and very difficult to handle. In particular, human analysis is almost impos-
sible, considering the amount of spam emails daily caught by a spam honeypot
[28,29]. On the other hand, an automated and accurate analysis requires the
usage of correctly trained computational intelligence tools, i.e. classifiers, whose
training requires accurately chosen datasets, which presents to the classifier a
good reality description in which it will be employed. Moreover, due to the high
variance of spam emails, a valid training set may become obsolete in few weeks,
and a new up-to-date training set must be generated in a short period of time.
Though previous work largely improved the state of the art in analysis of
spam emails for forensic purposes, more improvement is still needed. In particu-
lar, previous work either focuses on a specific cybercrime only, especially phishing
[11], or exploit in the analysis a small set of features not effective in identifying
some cybercrime emails. For example, the analysis of email text words [14], link
domains [10] is not effective in identifying emails used to distribute malware,
which often do not contain text [20] , or spam emails with dynamic links [5].
Paper Contribution: In this paper we propose Digital Waste Sorter (DWS),
a framework which exploits a self learning goal of the spammer -based approach
for spam email classification. The proposed approach aims at automatically clas-
sifying large amount of raw unclassified spam emails dividing them into cam-
paigns and labeling each campaign with its spammer goals. To this end, we
propose five class labels to group spammer goals in five macro-groups, namely
Advertisement, Portal Redirection, Advanced Fee Fraud, Malware Distribution
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and Phishing. Moreover, a set of 21 categorical features representative of email
structure is proposed to perform a multi-feature analysis aimed at identifying
emails related to a large range of cybercrimes. DWS is based on the coopera-
tion of unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms. Given a set of classes
describing different spammer goals and a dataset of non classified spam emails,
the proposed approach at first automatically creates a valid training set for a
classifier exploiting a categorical clustering algorithm, named CCTree (Categori-
cal Clustering Tree). In more detail, this clustering algorithm divides the dataset
into structurally similar groups of emails, named spam campaigns [7]. DWS is
built on the results of CCTree , which is effective in dividing spam emails in
homogeneous clusters. Afterward, significant spam campaigns useful in the gen-
eration of the training set are selected through similarity with a small set of
known emails, representative of each spam class. Hence, a classifier is trained
using the selected campaigns as training set, and will be used to classify the
remaining unclassified emails of the dataset.
To further meet the needs of forensic investigators, which have limited time
and resource to perform email examinations [9], the DWS methodology does not
require a prior knowledge of dataset, except the desired classes (i.e. spammer
goals) and a small set of emails representative of each class. It is worth noting
that this email set cannot be used to train the classifier. In fact, this set contains
a small number of emails not belonging to the dataset to be classified, being thus
not necessarily descriptive of the reality in which the classifier will operate.
In the following, we will describe in details the DWS framework, explaining
the process of division in campaigns, training set generation and campaigns clas-
sification. The framework effectiveness has been evaluated against a set of 3200
recent raw spam emails extracted by a honeypot. DWS reported a classification
accuracy on this preliminary dataset of 97.8%. Furthermore, to justify the clas-
sifier selection, an analysis of performances on different classifiers is presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports related work
on email classification. Section 3 presents the DWS framework and work-flow in
details, also it gives brief background information on the clustering algorithm.
Section 4 presents the results of the analysis on a real dataset of spam emails,
as well as a comparison on the classification results of four different classifiers.
Finally Sect. 5 briefly concludes reporting planned future extensions.
2 Related Work
In the literature, the spam campaigns are usually labeled based on characteristic
strings (keywords) representing individual campaign types as in [10,18] and [13].
These approaches are weak against the kind of spam emails which do not contain
keywords or that use word obfuscation techniques. Pathak et al. [21] label spam
campaigns on the base of URLs, phone number, Skype ID, and Mail ID used as
contact information. This methodology is effective only against emails reporting
contacts, which are only a subset of all the spam emails found in the wild.
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There are several approaches in the literature in which the spammer goal is
considered. However, these approaches are mainly focused on detecting phish-
ing emails, not considering other spammer purposes. Fette et al. [11] applied 10
email features to discern phishing emails from ham (good) emails. Bergholz et al.
[6] propose a similar methodology with additional features to train a classifier in
order to filter phishing emails. Almomani et al. [3] provide a survey on different
techniques in filtering phishing emails, while Gansterer et al. [12] compare differ-
ent machine learning algorithms in phishing detection. Furthermore, the authors
propose a technique which refines the previous phishing filtering approaches. In
this work, three types of messages, named ham, spam and phishing are distin-
guished automatically. Nevertheless, the category of emails containing spam, is
not precisely characterized. In [8] a methodology to detect phishing emails based
on both machine learning and heuristics is proposed. These approaches report
accuracy ranging from 92% to 96%, where the classifiers have been trained
through labeled datasets. On the contrary, DWS generates the training set on
the fly, without requiring a pre-trained classifier. Notwithstanding, in the per-
formed experiments DWS shows comparable accuracy.
3 Digital Waste Sorting
DWS is a framework which takes as input datasets of unclassified spam emails.
Hence, DWS divides the emails in campaigns by mean of a hierarchical clustering
algorithm, then labels each campaign through a classifier. The classifier is trained
on the fly, through a training set generated by DWS directly from the unlabeled
input dataset, exploiting the knowledge generated by the clustering algorithm.
This section describes in details the DWS framework and methodology. First,
we will present the classes used to label each spam campaign. Then, we present
the feature extraction process from raw emails, discussing the features relevance
in describing structural elements of an email and their relation to each spam
class. The framework is then presented, briefly introducing the clustering algo-
rithm and the methodology for the generation of the training set. Finally the
classification process is presented.
3.1 Definition of Classes
As anticipated, spam emails can be sent with different intentions, spanning from
the common advertisement to vectors of different cybercrimes. We argue that
spam emails can be divided in five well-known macro-groups which represent the
main target of spammers, and can thus be used to label spam campaigns.
Advertisement: The advertisement class contains those emails whose target is
convincing a user to buy a specific product [17]. Advertisement emails embody
the most typical idea of spam messages, advertising any kind of product which
could be of interest of companies or private users. Generally these emails only
constitute a hindrance to the users that have to spend time removing them from
the inbox. The main requirements for a commercial email to be legal according to
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Federal Trade Commission [2], is that it uses no deceptive subject lines, provides
correct complete header information, real physical location of the business, offers
an opt-out choice, and honors opt-out requests in 10 business days. In this paper,
we consider as advertisement emails both the ones which comply with the legal
requirements and the ones that does not, given that their purpose is clearly
advertising a product.
Portal Redirection: Portal redirection spam emails are the enablers of an
evolved advertisement methodology. This spam emails are characterized by a
minimal structure generally reporting one or more links to one or more websites.
Once the user clicks on the link, she is redirected several times to different
pages whose address is dynamically generated. The final target page is mostly an
advertisement portal with several links divided by categories, generally related to
common user needs (e.g., medical insurance). This strategy is useful in reducing
the legal responsibility on spam emails of the companies which are advertising a
product. The rationale is that the advertised company cannot be sued because
another website, i.e. the portal, links to it. As an example, the opt-out clause of
advertisement emails [16] does not apply. Moreover, the multi-redirection with
dynamic links strategy makes difficult to track the responsible websites. The
strategy of portal redirection emails, is also used to redirect users on websites
with the intention of defrauding the users, or to distribute malicious code.
Advanced Fee Fraud: An advanced fee fraud or confidence trick spam email
(synonyms include confidence scheme or scam) attempts to defraud a person
after first gaining their confidence, used in the classical sense of trust [15]. Con-
fidential trick spam exploits social engineering to trick the user in paying, by her
own will, a certain amount of money to the spammer. Scammers may use several
techniques to deceive the user in paying money, generally exploiting sentimental
relations or promising a large amount of money in return. The confidential trick
emails, mostly are written in a friendly long text, to convince the victim the
interactions. These kinds of emails, usually, do not redirect the users to other
web pages, mainly contain an email address.
Malware: Emails are an important vector for spreading malicious software or
malware. Generally the malware is sent as email attachment, while the email
structure is very simple, with a small text which encourages the reader to open
the attachment or no text at all [20]. Once opened, the malware infects the user
device, showing different possible malicious behaviors. Often the malicious file
is camouflaged, inserted in a zip file or with a modified extension, which allows
to deceive basic anti-virus control implemented by some spam filters.
Phishing: Phishing emails attempt to redirect users to websites, which are
designed to obtain credentials or financial data such as usernames, passwords,
and credit card detail illegally [3]. Generally, these emails pretend to be sent
by a banking organization, or coming from a service accessible through user-
name and password, e.g. social networks, instant messaging etc., reporting fake
security issues that will require the user to confirm her data to access again the
service. To this end, phishing emails are mostly very well presented with a well
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organized structure, even reporting contact informations such as phone num-
bers and email. The representative structure of phishing emails we applied in
this research, contain short well written text, providing the victim some impor-
tant news. Mostly there exists one link, which direct the user to a very well
designed fake website of a bank, which asks the victim to provide her credit card
information.
3.2 Feature Extraction
DWS parses raw spam emails (eml files) extracting a set of 21 categorical fea-
tures building a numerical vector readable by clustering and classification algo-
rithms. The extracted features are reported in Table 1, with a brief description,
whilst the values which each feature may assume is reported in [25]. The “num-
ber of recipients” which are in the To and Cc fields of the email differentiate
between emails which should look strictly personal, e.g. communications from
a bank (phishing) and those that pretend to be sent to several recipients, such
as some kind of frauds or advertisement. The structure of links in the email
text gives several information useful in determining the email goal. Portal redi-
rections emails and advertisement generally show a high “Number of links”, in
the first case to redirect the user to different portal websites, in the second one
to redirect the user to the website where she can buy the products. Generally,
fraud emails do not report links except for “IP based links”. These links are
expressed through IP addresses, without reporting domain names, to reduce the
Table 1. Features extracted from each email.
Attribute Description
RecipientNumber Number of recipients addresses.
NumberOfLinks Total links in email text.
NumberOfIPBasedLinks Links shown as an IP address.
NumberOfMismatchingLinks Links with a text different from the real link.
NumberOfDomainsInLinks Number of domains in links.
AvgDotsPerLink Average number of dots in link in text.
NumberOfLinksWithAt Number of links containing “@”.
NumberOfLinksWithHex Number of links containing hex chars.
NumberOfNonAsciiLinks Number of links with non-ASCII chars.
IsHtml True if the mail contains html tags.
EmailSize The email size, including attachments.
Language Email language.
AttachmentNumber Number of attachments.
AttachmentSize Total size of email attachments.
AttachmentType File type of the biggest attachment.
WordsInSubject Number of words in subject.
CharsInSubject Number of chars in subject.
ReOrFwdInSubject True if subject contains “Re” or “Fwd”.
SubjectLanguage Language of the subject.
NonAsciiCharsInSubject Number of non ASCII chars in subject.
ImagesNumber Number of images in the email text.
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likelihood of being tracked or to make the email text, generally discussing about
secret money transaction, more legitimate. The “number of domains in links”
represents the number of different domains globally found in all the links in
the email text. Phishing and advertisement emails generally have just a single
domain respectively of the website where to buy the advertised product and
the website of the authority which the message pretends to be sent from. On
the other hand portal redirection may contain several domains to redirect the
reader to different portal websites. Moreover, links in portal redirection emails
generally have a high “average number of dots in links” (i.e. sub-domains) and
being dynamically generated are likely to contain hexadecimal or non ASCII -
characters. Non ASCII characters in the links are also typical of some adver-
tisement emails redirecting to foreign websites. It is worth noting that all these
link-based features consider the real destination address, not the clickable text
shown to the user. If the clickable text (hyper-link) shows an address (“click
here”-like text is not considered) different from the destination address, the link
is considered mismatching and counted through the feature “mismatching links”.
Phishing and portal redirection emails make extensive use of mismatching links
to deceive the user. For a further insight, a sample for each class is shown in
Fig. 1. Advertisement and phishing emails may appear like a web-page. In this
case, the email contains HTML tags. On the other hand, fraud, malware and
portal emails rarely are presented in HTML format. The size of an email is
another important structural feature. Confidential trick and portal redirections
generally are quite small in size, considering they are raw text. Advertisement,
malware and some kind of phishing emails generally have a more complex struc-
ture, including images and/or attachments, which makes the message size to
noticeably grow. “Attachment Number”, “Attachment Size” and “Attachment
Type” are structural features mainly used to distinguish between the attach-
ment of malware emails and those of advertisement and phishing emails, which
attach to the email images for a correct visualization. The “Number of Images”
in an email determines the global look of the message. Images are typical of
some advertisement emails and phishing ones. Finally three features are used for
the analysis of the subject. For example, some advertisement emails use several
one-character words or non ASCII characters in emails to deceive typical spam
detection techniques based on keywords [22]. It is worth noting that rarely non
ASCII characters are used in phishing emails, to make them look more legit.
Moreover, some fraud and phishing emails send deceiving mail subject with the
“Re”: or “Fwd”: keyword to look like part of a conversation triggered by the vic-
tim. Furthermore, some fraud emails are characterized by the difference between
the email “Language” and the “Subject Language”. Many scam emails are, in
fact, translated through automatic software which ignore the subject, causing
this language duality.
3.3 DWS Classification Workflow
After the email features have been extracted, the resulting feature vectors are
given as input to the DWS classification workflow. This process aims at divid-
ing the unclassified spam emails in campaign and label them through a classifier
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(a) Advertisement (b) Portal (c) Fraud
(d) Phishing (e) Malware
Fig. 1. Spam emails representing five categories of spammer goals.
trained on the fly. The workflow is depicted in Fig. 2. The main part of the work-
flow is aimed at generating a valid training set from the dataset of unclassified
emails, applying hierarchical clustering algorithm to divide email in campaigns
(step 1 in Fig. 2). The chosen algorithm, named Categorical Clustering Tree
(CCTree) generates a tree-like structure (step 2) which is exploited to associate
a campaign to each email coming from a small dataset of labeled emails. The
campaign receives the label of the email associated to it (step 3). Thus, this set
of campaigns is used as training set for a classifier (step 4), successively used to
label all the remaining campaigns (steps 5 and 6).
In the following the six steps of the DWS workflow are described in detail.
Phase 1: Clustering Spam Emails into Campaigns. The first step per-
formed by the DWS framework is to divide large amounts of unclassified spam
emails (constituting the set D) into smaller groups of similar messages (steps 1
and 2 in Fig. 2). Emails are clustered by structural similarity exploiting the
CCTree algorithm.
CCTree Algorithm: CCTree is a categorical clustering algorithm, constructed
iteratively through a decision tree-like structure. The root of the CCTree contains
all the elements to be clustered. Each element is described through a set of
categorical attributes, such as the Language of a message. Being categorical each
attribute may assume a finite set of discrete values, constituting its domain. For
example the attribute Language may have as domain: {English, French, Spanish}.
At each step, a new level of the tree is generated by splitting the nodes of the
previous levels, when they are not homogeneous enough. Shannon Entropy [23]
is used both to define a homogeneity measure called node purity, and to select
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Fig. 2. DWS Workflow.
the attribute used to split a node. In particular non-leaf nodes are divided on
the base of the attribute yielding the maximum value for Shannon entropy. The
separation is represented through a branch for each possible outcome of the
specific attribute. Each branch or edge extracted from parent node is labeled
with the selected feature which directs data to the child node. Finally the leaves
of the tree are the desired clusters. We refer the reader to [24] for details on the
CCTree algorithm.
The CCTree algorithm has already proven to be effective in clustering spam
emails into campaigns, as shown in [25]. When used on large dataset with the
same set of features presented in Sect. 3.2, the CCTree algorithm generates highly
homogeneous clusters, where all emails inside the same cluster belong to the same
campaign. As other clustering algorithms which aim at maximizing the cluster
homogeneity, the CCTree algorithm is likely to generate some clusters with only
one element. Generally these clusters contain outlier emails, i.e. messages not
belonging to any specific campaign. DWS discards these clusters not using them
in the following steps of algorithm.
Phase 2: Training Set Generation. In order to label the campaigns, it is nec-
essary to train a classifier to recognize emails coming from the five predefined
spam classes (steps 3 and 4 in Fig. 2). To this end, it is necessary to provide
to the classifier a good training set, which has to be representative of the real-
ity in which the classifier has to operate. For this reason the training set will
be extracted from the unclassified emails dataset D itself. More specifically, the
CCTree structure generated in previous step is exploited to label a small num-
ber of generated spam campaigns. To this end, small number of campaigns are
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labeled with the use of a small set of labeled emails C. This set contains a small
number of manually selected spam emails, equally distributed in the five classes,
all structurally different. These spam emails do not come from the D set. The
emails in the C dataset have to be accurately chosen on the base of the email that
investigator are interested in. For example, Italian police investigators interested
in following a phishing case should put in the C dataset some emails with Italian
text and bank names. After extracting the value of the features from the email in
C, they are fed one by one to the CCTree generated on D. Following the CCTree
structure each email ci is eventually inserted in the campaign Cj (Fig. 3). Thus
the campaign Cj is labeled with the class of ci and all its emails are added to
the training set.
Fig. 3. Insert new instance X in a CCTree
If the same spam campaign is reached by two or more emails of different
classes, the campaign is discarded and the emails are re-evaluated to be sent to
other campaigns. It is worth noting that such an event is unlikely due to the
high homogeneity of the clusters generated through CCTree. Furthermore, in the
event that an email in C does not reach to any campaign, i.e. a specific attribute
value of the email is not present in the CCTree, the email is inserted in the more
similar campaign. To this end, the node purity of each campaign is calculated
before and after the insertion of the email ci. The email is thus assigned to
the campaign in which the difference between the two purities, weighted by the
number of elements, is lesser.
Phase 3: Labeling Spam Campaigns. Feeding the training set to the clas-
sifier, we are able to classify all remaining campaigns generated by the CCTree
(steps 5 and 6 in Fig. 2). To this end, each campaign resulted from CCTree
is given to the classifier. The classifier labels each email of received campaign
on the base of spammer purpose. Under two conditions DWS considers a spam
campaign as non classified. Firstly, it is possible that emails belonging to the
same campaign receive different labels, e.g. phishing and portal redirection. In
such a case, calling as “majority class” the label with more emails in the clus-
ter, the campaign is considered non classified if the emails of the majority class
amount to less than 90% of all the emails in the campaign. The second condi-
tion is instead related to the prediction error reported by the classifier on each
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element of a campaign. The predicted error, computed as 1−P (ei ∈ Ωj), where
P (ei ∈ Ωj) is the probability that the element ei belongs to the class Ωj , i.e. the
label assigned to the element ei. DWS framework considers a campaign as non
classified, if the average predicted error is more than 30%. If the non classified
campaigns are a consistent percentage, it is possible to restart the classification
process running the CCTree algorithm with tighter criteria for node purity.
4 Results
This section presents the experimental results of the DWS framework. First we
discuss the classifier selection process, exploiting two small datasets of manually
labeled spam emails. Afterward, we present the results for a real use case of the
DWS framework on a recent dataset of spam emails.
4.1 Classifier Selection
In this first set of experiments we compare the performance of three different
classifiers. To this end, two sets of real spam emails are provided to be used as
training and test sets. These two datasets are extracted from emails collected by
the untroubled honeypot [1] in February and January 2015. The emails have been
manually analyzed and labeled for standard supervised learning classification
and performance evaluation. The manual analysis and labeling process has been
performed rigorously analyzing text and images, and following the links in each
email. Only the emails for which the discovered class was certain have been
inserted to the datasets. For a spam email, the label is certain if it matches
the label description given in Sect. 3.1 and the label is verified through manual
analysis. For example, Portal Redirection emails are certainly labeled if the links
really redirect to a portal website. The first dataset, used as training set, is made
of 160 spam emails, the second one, used as test set, is made of 80 emails.
Experiments have been run on all the classifiers offered by the WEKA library
to classify categorical data. For the sake of brevity and clarity we only report the
classifier with the better results for each classifier group. More specifically, the
chosen classifiers are the K-Star from the Lazy group, the Random Tree Forest
from the Tree group and the Bayes Network from the NaiveBayes group. Among
these three classifiers, the best one has been used by the DWS framework.
Dataset Dimensioning: The process of manual analysis and labeling is time
consuming. However, it is necessary to have a dataset well balanced, without
duplicates and representative of the five classes, needed to correctly assess clas-
sifier performances. Given the complexity of manual analysis procedure, it is not
possible to choose training and testing set of extremely large dimension. Thus,
standard dimensioning techniques have been used, for both training and testing
set. A general rule to assess the minimum size for a training set is to dimension it
as six times the number of used features [27]. It is worth noting that the training
set of 160 elements already matches this condition (6 × 21 < 160). However, in
multi-class problem, the dimension of data should provide well result in terms
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Table 2. Classification results evaluated with K-fold validation on training set.
Algorithm K-star RandomForest BayesNet
True Positive Rate 0.956 0.937 0.95
False Positive Rate 0.01 0.019 0.013
Area Under Curve 0.996 0.992 0.996
of sensitivity and specificity, i.e. true positive rate (TPR) and (1 - false posi-
tive rate (FPR)) respectively, when K-fold validation is applied [4]. This must
be done keeping balanced the relative frequencies of data in various classes. As
shown in the following, the provided testing set returns for K-fold validation a
value of Receiver Operating Characteristic’s Area Under Curve (ROC-AUC or
AUC for short) higher than 90% for all tested classifiers.
Concerning the test set, it is important the null intersection with the train-
ing set and the balanced relative frequencies of the various classes. In [4], the
minimum size for a testing set to provide meaningful results, in a problem of
classification with five classes, is estimated to be 75, which is smaller than the
test set of 80 spam emails provided.
Classification Results: We report now the classification results for the three
tested classifiers on the two aforementioned datasets. The first set has been
used as training set for the classifiers. According to the methodology in [4],
a first performance evaluation has been done through the K-fold (K=5) vali-
dation method, classifying the data for K times using each time K − 1/K of
the dataset as training set and the remaining elements as testing set. The used
evaluation indexes are the True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR)
and Receiver Operating Characteristic Area Under Curve (ROC-AUC or simply
AUC). The AUC is defined in the interval [0, 1] and measures the performance
of a classifier at the variation of a threshold parameter T , proper of the classifier
itself, according to the following formula:
AUC =
∫ ∞
−∞
TPR(T ) · FPR′(T )dT
where FPR′ = 1 − FPR. When the value of AUC is equal to 1, the classifier is
considered “good” for the classification problem.
Table 2 reports TPR, FPR and AUC of the three classifiers, i.e. the number
of correctly classified elements between the five classes for both the K-fold test
on the first dataset (160 spam emails). As shown, all classifiers return an accu-
racy higher than 90%. Afterward, the whole first dataset has been used to train
the three classifiers, whilst the second dataset has been used as test set. Table 3
reports the detailed classification results, where classifiers are trained with train-
ing set (160 emails) and evaluated with test set (80 emails). The result is reported
on the classes for TPR, FPR and AUC. For a further insight, we report in Fig. 4
the comparison of the ROC curves of the three classifiers for the five classes,
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Table 3. Classification results evaluated on test set.
Algorithm K-star RandomForest BayesNet
Measure TPR FPR AUC TPR FPR AUC TPR FPR AUC
Advertisement 1.000 0.031 0.998 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.031 0.967
Portal 0.786 0.000 0.996 0.786 0.016 0.985 0.929 0.000 0.998
Fraud 1.000 0.016 0.992 1.000 0.016 0.951 1.000 0.016 0.928
Malware 0.938 0.016 0.995 0.938 0.016 0.908 0.938 0.016 0.957
Phishing 0.947 0.017 0.977 0.947 0.051 0.963 0.842 0.017 0.907
Average 0.9342 0.016 0.9916 0.9342 0.019 0.9614 0.9418 0.016 0.9514
Fig. 4. ROC curves for the five classes labeling on test set.
measured on the test set. It is worth noting that in all cases the area under the
ROC curve is close to 1, hence, in general the classifiers show good performances
on the testing set for each class.
As can be observed in Table 2, on the average the K-star and Bayes Net clas-
sifiers give slightly better K-fold results. However, the K-star classifier yields the
better results in terms of AUC in average, evaluated with test set (see Table 3).
Therefore, K-star is the classifier used in the DWS framework.
4.2 DWS Application
The second set of experiments aims at assessing the capability of the framework
to cluster and label large amounts of spam emails. To this end the DWS frame-
work has been tested on set of 3230 recent spam emails. The spam emails have
been extracted from the collection of the honeypot in [1], related to the first
week of March 2015. The emails have been manually analyzed and labeled for
performance analysis.
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Phase 1: Clustering with CCTree: In the first step CCTree has been used
to divide the emails in campaigns. The CCTree parameters have been chosen
finding the optimal values for number of generated clusters and homogeneity,
using the knee method described in [25]. 135 clusters have been generated of
which 73 only contains one element. Generated clusters with a single element
have not been considered. These emails are, in fact, outliers which do not belong
to any spam campaign. The remaining 3149 emails divided in 62 clusters have
been used for the following steps.
Phase 2: Training Set Generation: To generate the training set, we used
a small dataset made of three representative emails for each of the five classes.
These 15 emails have been manually selected from different datasets of real
spam emails, including personal spam inbox of the authors. To facilitate the
manual analysis of the classified spam emails, the 15 emails of the set C are
written in English language. Each email has been assigned to one of the 62
spam campaigns, following the CCTree structure, as described in Sect. 3.3. The
campaigns associated to each email are used as training set.
Table 4. Training set generated from small knowledge.
Class Number of Emails Number of Campaigns
Advert. 29 2
Portal 66 3
Fraud 113 3
Malware 27 1
Phishing 17 1
Total 252 10
The generated training set (Table 4) is composed of 252 emails, contained in
10 campaigns. It is worth noting that the 15 emails have not been added to the
associated cluster after the CCTree classification, to not alter the decision on
the following emails.
Phase 3: Labeling Spam Campaigns: After training the classifier with the
generated training set, we label the remaining (52 out of 62) unlabeled spam
campaigns of CCTree. The classification results are reported in Table 5. The
table reports for each class the amount of campaigns and corresponding email
classified correctly or incorrectly. Moreover, we report for the emails the statistics
on TPR, FPR and Accuracy (i.e., the ratio of correctly classified elements). The
global accuracy, (last row of the table) is of 97,82%. However, we point out that,
due to the conditions on predicted error reported in Subsect. 3.3, 8 campaigns
out of 62, containing 344 spam emails are considered unclassified. For the sake of
accuracy, considering these 8 campaigns as misclassified, the total accuracy for
emails on the dataset is of 87,14%. The accuracy is in line with previous works
on classification emails into phishing and ham [6,8,11].
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Table 5. DWS classification results for the labeled spam campaigns.
Class Campaigns Emails TPR FPR Accuracy
Correct Wrong Correct Wrong
Advert. 5 0 137 0 1 0 1
Portal 26 0 1331 0 1 0.03 0.9935
Fraud 10 2 1032 43 0.96 0.01 0.9788
Malware 3 0 31 0 1 1 1
Phishing 7 1 213 18 0.915 0 0.994
Total 51 3 2744 61 0.975 0.008 0.9782
Concerning the 8 non classified campaigns, 3 campaigns containing 68 spam
emails were correctly labeled as portal. However, they are considered unclassified
since the average predicted error is higher than 30% in all the 3 campaigns.
4 campaigns containing 258 spam emails have been classified as phishing. 2
of them with 116 messages, were correctly identified but did not match the
predicted error condition. The other 2 campaigns have been incorrectly classified
as fraud. However, they are considered as unclassified due to high predicted error.
The last campaign with 18 elements is in the advertisement class, but incorrectly
classified as fraud, though the predicted error condition again is not matched. It
is worth noting how the condition on predicted error is useful in increasing the
overall accuracy on classified data.
From Table 5 it is possible to infer what a large portion of spam messages
belongs to portal and fraud classes. Even if these preliminary results are related
to a relatively small dataset, they are indicative of the current trend of spam
emails distribution, which may provide to the spammer the greatest result with
the smallest risk.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
Spam emails constitute a constant threat to both companies and private users.
Not only these emails are unwanted, occupy storage space and need time to be
deleted, also they have become vectors of security threat and used to perform
cybercrimes, such as phishing and malware distribution. In this paper, we have
presented a framework, named DWS, for analysis of large amounts of spam
emails collected through honeypots. We argue that DWS can provide a helpful
tool for police and investigators in forensic analysis of spam emails. In fact
DWS automatically clusters and classifies large amount of spam emails in labeled
campaigns, to eventually help investigator to focus on campaigns for a specific
cybercrime, filtering out the non-interesting spam emails. Moreover DWS is self
learning, not requiring any preexistent knowledge of the dataset to analyze.
Preliminary tests performed on a first dataset of more than 3200 emails
showed a good accuracy of the framework. More extensive experiments on larger
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datasets have been planned as future work, including performance analysis and
an eventual refinement of the spam campaign labels, to include sub-groups such
as pharmacy-advertisement or additional classes such as propaganda. To improve
the effectiveness of DWS, we plan to detect and add more email representative
features. Furthermore, application of dataset balancing techniques could be used
to increase the quality of the generated training set.
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